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The Liberal Premise

Commitments in Search of a Premise
The fundamental human dilemma is how to escape from the jungle without landing
in the zoo.
How is it possible to prevent the community from fracturing into fearful and
ruinous hostilities while protecting the individual from the heel of an intolerant,
superior ruler? Nearly four centuries ago, a beguiling idea seized the western imagination: A just balance between disorder and repression could be achieved if the
state withdrew from the business of imposing an ultimate good. Liberalism, the
philosophical venture that promoted this apparently simple idea, holds that it is not
only possible but also morally proper to govern by refraining from decreeing ultimate ends, and that the state's only business is to prevent people from harming each
other, not to engage in moral projects. Laws and political institutions should free
us to seek and fulfill our own good as best we can without interfering in the same
pursuit by others. Liberalism is thus a common life led at arm's length: We can live
together, but not so close that either we must watch our backs or someone else must
look over our shoulders. This regime of "ordered liberty"1 has empowered large
numbers of people to shape their own lives, and the release of energy has led to the
most astonishing transformation in the human condition known to history.
The liberal venture was audacious, and for two significant reasons. First, it flew in
the face of historical evidence. The state had always been an ordainment of God, not
an artifact of man. The place of people, families, citizens, subjects, and slaves was
fated and fixed-from ancient times through the Renaissance, the state that bound
them was thought to be part of the natural order. 2 Although history records many
kinds of states, in all of them rulers ruled1 they did not serve, and they ruled to promote the good that they commanded. To do otherwise would risk disorder, even
chaos and depravity.
The liberal venture was audacious, second, because it required the paradoxical
belief, as things worked out, that only in the state and by obedience to law was it
possible to be free. Contrived to remove the yoke of the state, liberalism ultimately
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was tethered to it. Some acclaimed philosophers of liberty went further, arguing
that freedom requires wholesale submission-in Rousseau's famous words, citizens
"shall be forced to be free." 3 Without a fine balance, liberalism risks devouring itself.
Liberalism did not arrive all at once or anywhere conquer the ground completely.'' Nevertheless, a set of foundational beliefs took root and ripened into political institutions and practices that today are widely familiar as the halhnarks ofliberal
regimes. Although no two writers provide the same list- liberalism is a voluminous
5
collection of commentaries without a central scripture -most of these institutions
and practices can easily enough be named. "The core practices of a liberal political
order," says Stephen Holmes,
are religious toleration, freedom of discussion, restrictions on police
behavior, free elections, constitutional government based on a separation
of powers, publicly inspectable state budgets to inhibit corruption, and
economic policy committed to sustained growth on the basis of private
ownership and freedom of contract. Liberalism's four core norms or
values are personal sewrity (the monopolization oflegitimate violence by
agents of the state who are themselves monitored and regulated by law),
impartiality (a single system oflaw applied equally to all), individualltberty
(a broad sphere of freedom from collective or governmental supervision,
including freedom of conscience, the right to be different, the right to pur
sue ideals one's neighbor thinks wrong, the freedom to travel and emigrate, and so forth), and democracy or the right to participate in lawmaking
by means of elections and public discussion through a free press.6
Other practices that belong on this list include freedom of association; a universal
franchise; fair hearings; jury trials; an independent bar; public education; universal
literacy; civilian control of the military; equal right to pursue occupations; and prohibitions against hereditary privileges, secret and ex post facto laws, group guilt, the
selling of public office, and self-exemption (i.e., everyone, including the lawmaker, is
to be subject to the Jaw).' An additional practice, less often remarked but essential to
the notion of fair procedure, is that people are to be held accountable by the norms
ofscientifically accessible evidence.8 These, collectively, are the liberal commitments.
Though at this level of generality the liberal institutional and procedural commitments are broadly accepted throughout the western world and increasingly beyond1
their descriptive label has been under steady and often heavy attack, from both the
right and the Jeft1 for many decades {and longer9). At the outset of World War II,
Ezra Pound put it that liberalism was a "mess of mush.''10 A few years later, in the
early days of the cold war, a liberal was said to be "only a hop, skip, and a jump from
a Communist.'' 11 A generation later, an acclaimed conservative philosopher asserted
that liberalism has put ''morality today ... in a state of grave disorder." 12 Now, in the
early twenty-first century, a weU-known historian writes that liberalism connotes
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"something damnable, unhealthy, and odious.''13 On the left, a noted legal scholar
proclaimed that "life in modern, liberal society continually denies us the possession
14
of coherent personality.'' A political philosopher, summarizing a strand of communitarian thought, notes that "liberalism is said to undermine community, to restrict
unduly opportunities for democratic participation, to create inegalitarian hierarchy,
and to reinforce egoistic social conflict at the expense of the common good."15
The less academically inclined, on entering any used bookstore, can find tracts
1
many by well-known commentators, that procla.im liberalism a "mentaJ disorder"
"goilless," a "sin~·· "evil," a "tragedy ' an "assault,~ laclting common sense, "fascist,"I
1
"death," "a demonic mob/' and1 more limp, though starkly oxvmoronic wanting
~
~
~
I
erty. And from the modern medium of the blogosphere comes a jejune complaint about the very sound of it: "The biggest problem with modern American
liberalism may be the word itself -it just hits the car wrong." 17 Cynically1 one might
suppose the truer claim is that liberalism foments hysteria.
How can these attacks on liberalism (which by its very principles encourages

~he':") ~e squared with the reality of widespread and deeply rooted liberal political

mst~tu~.~ns? The most obvious answer is that the word has multiple meanings. "Lib~r~lism, IS a confederation of connotations, not all consistent or necessarily con·
JO~ed. Overuse and overextension of [the tcnn) have rendered it so amorphous,"
Judith Shklar insisted1 "that it can now serve as an all-purpose word, whether of
18
abuse or praise.'' Liberalism, says Raymond Geuss, "has no definition.''19 He means,
I should suppose, that it has too many. 20
In the realm of politics, especially American party politics, liberalism can stand for
minimalist government, an expansive welfare state, and everything in between. 21 It is
sometimes taken as a synonym for utilitarianism or egalitarianism (moral theories
ab~ut.h~an ends) or democracy {a theory about means). 22 In a more philosophical
vem, 1t IS associated with a general idea about individuality, "the belief that the
~eedom of the individual is the highest political value, and that institutions and practices are to be judged by their success in promoting it." 23 Individuality itself can be
24
expressed in a multitude of ways. A political-sociological approach has it that "no
person may be forcibly imprisoned w1thin the class or clan or even family into which
25
he was born." A political-psychological approach holds that "liberals are committed
to a conception of freedom and of respect for the capacities and the agency of indi26
vidual ~en and women.'' And sometimes the political conception is put in moral
t~rms: [T]he ideal of individual sovereignty ... holds that the only things that can
nghtly ~e.r~quired of human beings ... are those forms of conduct that are necessary
t~ ma.xmuzmg the scope of everyone's freedom to control his or her life according to
his or her own judgments.'127
Often, liberalism is taken as a rationalist approach to human problems specifi-

call~, ~e idea that we can and therefore should be social engineers and not rely on
1

tradition. Just after World War II, Chester Bowles put it that ''liberalism is an attitude.
The chief characteristics of that attitude arc human sympathy, a receptivity to
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change and a scientific willingness to follow reason rather than faith or any fixed set
of ideas.'' 28 A century earlier, John Henry Cardinal Newman, a critic, took it as
29
expressing the philosophical attitude that all change is good. 'TI1e liberal is thus
often characterized as one who believes in the possibility of progress in human
affairs, and is less likely than the conservative to be deterred in proposing change for
30
fear that it will result in unanticipated baneful consequences.
Quite separately, liberalism may describe psychological or cultural moods. Max
Frankel described these senses in a series of polarities contrasting liberalism and
conservatism:
It is liberal to expect corporations to behave like the government. It is
conservative to expect the government to behave like corporations .... It
is liberal to risk high-priced failure and costly overruns in almost every
federal department, except the Pentagon. It is conservative to risk them
only in the Pentagon .... It is liberal to favor government subsidy for the
Metropolitan Opera. It is conservative to favor government subsidy for
the Mets .... It is liberal to wish to expunge most criminal records, except
for those seeking to buy a pistol. It is conservative to keep such records
public, except for those seeking to buy a pistol. \I
The policy judgments expressed in these juxtapositions are not rooted in principle
but in preferences and outlook. Although Frankel's pairings relate to political matters, the temperament these terms describe need not be. A fiscal conservative can be
socially liberal (or, as in the case of the Republican Congress of the early twenty-first
century, socially conservative and fiscally liberal). A cultural liberal might feel
inclined to wear his hair long (or she, to wear it extra short or purple); a cultural conservative, to visit the barber weekly. But one's hairstyle does not determine beliefs
about gun control or gay marriage: The cultural liberal or conservative is not logically
committed to political liberalism or conservatism. Though they may go hand in
hand, they do not always: Home-schooling parents tend to be political conservatives.
Yet the very point of home schooling is that a family can teach specific members of
the next generation, free from the larger community's oversight; this is a form of individualism that one might have supposed would more likely be the creed of liberals.
In contrast, liberal proponents of public schooling appear to be advocating forms of
community building, not, according to some of its critics, a liberal characteristic.
Shortly after William F. BuckleyJr. died in February 2008, his son Christopher Buckley was asked: "Is liberalism dead in New York?" His response-"The key will be how
many people start arriving at Lincoln Center in pickups with gun racks."- is a sassy
reminder of the important distinction between cultural and political labels. u
Just as important, liberalism is a perspective on beliefs about the state of the world
and what counts as knowledge. The old joke has it that a conservative is a liberal who
was mugged, a liberal a conservative who was arrested: One's experiences of the

The Liberal Premise

7

world are taken to alter or fix one's outlook about policy and even what constitutes
fact. In 2008 reports of a bitterly cold winter in many parts of the United States
cheered a few Republicans because they thought the freeze disproved global warm. 33Th .
mg.
e mterpretation of an empirical observation and the factual conclusion they
took to follow from it seem oddly placed on a liberal-conservative continuum. Why
shouldn't such news cheer Democrats as well? No one could actually want to bear the
trouble and expense of repairing the effects of global warming if the threat is empty.
Presumably the Democrats refused to read the cold winter as evidence disproving the
global warming thesis. That political leanings can account for opinion of this sort
suggests that one's philosophical perspectives can determine factual beliefs about the
world logically independent of the content of the philosophy.
Attacks on liberalism have much less validity than their combined fierceness
migh~ suggest, since they arc aimed not necessarily at the philosophical beliefs that
sustam our political institutions and practices but at the varied other uses of the
wo:d. The United States may seem to be ideologically volatile, in the sense that it
SWings betwee~ the parties to express displeasure at the failure of the governing
~arty t~ solve ~cult problems. But there is no reason to suppose that underlying
liberal ms~tut10ns are spurned by a majority. Indeed, a recent and well-publicized
emblematic s1gn that the public is not ready to jettison liberal institutions was the
apparently nonironical warning to a Southern Republican congressman: "Keep
your Government hands off my Medicare."H
Still, that liberalism has so many meanings should counsel caution. Why use the
word _at _all? The answer is that it remains useful, if appropriately qualified, as the
descnptive ~er~ f~r a the~ry about the metes and bounds ofstate power. "[H)ardly
anyone demes, sa.td the mtellectual historian Shirley Robin Letwin "that 1.he distinctive political issue since the 18th century has been whether gove:ruuent should
5
do more or ~ess."~ What justifies the power of the state? Over what domains may
the stat~ legttlmatel~ govern against the wishes of dissenters? Rejecting the longheld Anstotelian belief that man is zoon po/itikon (a political animal whose ultimate
good is found onJy in the state),liberalism is the intuition that not everything in life
that matters can or should be shaped or bounded or fixed or cured by politics and
Ia~. It names a philosophical system that proposes why limited government, exemplified by the liberal commitments, provides the best chance of striking a livable
balance between disorder and repression, from one age to another.

The Harm Principle
l11c Ends, Means, Reach, and Shape of Government
To ~derstand and justify liberalism, to see why the commitments, institutions, and
practices that have been instantiated in its name and refined over the centuries are
consistent and valuable to human life, I propose returning to a core principle that is
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often taken for granted but rarely explored-the principle that the state's legitimacy
rests in how it deals with harm.
Many political philosophers reject this focus, not because harm should be
ignored but because a preoccupation with the ways we hurt each other seems un·
glamorous and insufficiently ennobling. Reducing suffering is worthy, to be sure,
but there is more to life than that. Surely there are more significant tasks for all of us
collectively to take on. We are called to greater things. We should not stay in the
trenches when some great good remains to be fought for and won. So perhaps the
key to justifying and limiting government power is to assign it to pursue a particular
good or set of goods and to judge its performance by its fidelity to the pursuit.
The problem for the theorist is that there is no accepted single, universal theory
of the good. Or to put it perhaps more precisely, there are too many possible candi
dates. Justice? Salvation? Morality? Tradition? God's will? Peace? Community?
Efficiency? Prosperity? Growth? Order? Nobility? The ruler's felicity? Human
flourishing? Autonomy? Adventure? Security? Glory? Conquest? Liberty?
Equality? Choice? Political participation? Personal happiness? Communal satisfaction? Some mixture of all these and more? Society teems with different and
often conflicting beliefs about the individual and collective good, and a multiplicity
of groups seck disparate ends within single national communities.
Some people are convinced that they know what is the highest good, and they
are prepared, or say they are prepared, to live with the consequences of tasking the
state with its fulfillment. So, for example, accepting the good of tradition and order
supports a foundational principle of at least one strand ofconservatism-that what
has endured is what is right- and provides the justification for preserving existing
36
institutions, whatever they may be and whoever they may oppress. Others wish a
state that will foster fidelity to God's wishes, as manifest in a particular religious
tradition; a theocracy results.
If we could agree on a common end, we could seek policies and practices to accompli~h it. But many who have thought through this problem-we might as well
call them "liberals"- are dubious that any of the many ends on offer will command
consensus. It is too late in human history, they suppose, to think that any group committed to a highest good will sacrifice it for a competing but inconsistent good held
17
by a more sizable share of others. Liberalism is thus a response both to pluralism
and to the difficulty of persuading dissenters to accept something other than what
their tradition teaches them. A final end or highest good, then, is unlikely to provide
an acceptable principle for limiting the exercise of governmental power, since in
striving to achieve many such ends people would likely cede the state unlimited
power or acquiesce in its acquiring such power. We know all too many societies that
have found themselves in thrall to just such a claim.
The task, then, is to find a workable principle of state action that is self-limiting,
that yields the liberal commitments we generally prize, and that preserves potentially valuable ends. Several candidates have been put forward, but most are complex
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and controversial (as we will shortly see). There is one function, however, that
almost everyone acknowledges government may properly undertake: to reduce,
deter, and redress the harms that people cause each other. As a theory of harm, liber~~m puts the injuries we cause each other at the center of focus: It is not just an
~ctivtty of government, but the rationale of government. Government is necessary
10 the way that engine oil is necessary: Something needs to keep friction at bay
and parts from rubbing together. Engine oil may not be alluring, but without it the
vehicle goes nowhere.
Dealing with harm is a venerable task ofgovernment, stretching back to the very
origins of the state. However adept or inept a particular state may have been in protecting its population from invaders and from each other, few can have rejected its
authority to do so, whatever other course or end it may have pursued (as most
throughout history have done). It is no revelation that states have safeguarded their
subjects unevenly at best. Poor and primitive states, those with feeble administra·
tive capacit}'J could do little. Hierarchical societies (and historically most have elevated king, clergy, and nobility over the masses) have protected the few to the
detriment of the many, actually causing harm to the low-born for the sake of those
in charge. So the efficacy and sincerity ofstates in pursuing their protective function
has, in most places and times, not been high. Still, the political arm of many societies
~retended to do so and over long periods of time began to do so. And as the liberal
Impulse took hold in the west, it came to be understood that the state should serve
an instrumental purpose: to defend, shield, secure, and protect its people. Though
Thomas Hobbes did not come to liberal conclusions, it was the focal point of his
16~1 political masterpiece, Leviathan, that the people assigned state power to a sovereign f~r the express purpose of protecting themselves from the war of all against
all. In his counterpoint four decades later, John Locke suffused his far more liberal
state with the explicit duty to guard against harm. Ever since, the liberal canon has
held that the state has a core duty to protect an ever-widening swath of the public.
T~day we accept without much thought that, in countries with liberal roots, the
state lS meant to serve us and not we the state. We take for granted that the state's
primary purpose is to keep us safe and to let us go about our business, so thoroughly
h~s the state's harm-repelling function penetrated. But for all our easy familiarity
With this principle ("it's a free country;· we commonly say, "I should be able to do
what I want as long as 1 don't hurt anybody"), we have not attended deeply to the
consequences ofsupposing that dealing with harm should be not merely the central
purpose ofgovernment but its only purpose.
This proposition- that the government should occupy itselfsolely with reducing
harm and its effects-has not been deeply understood, in part because its most eloquent proponent, John Stuart Mill, did not explore the meaning of harm, and in part
because political theorists have not supposed the harm principle sufficiently powerful to account for all that they want the liberal state to do. To the contrary, I contend
throughout this book, the harm principle deserves a closer look than it usually gets
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because its contours can be filled in, because it is self-limiting, and because from
it we can derive all the significant liberal commitments. Since as an explanatory
principle it is both less controversial and less complex than the other leading candidates, it is more likely, once explained, to attract support (indeed, it is likely already
the basis of widespread unreflective support) for liberal institutions and practices.
Though I postpone to a later section an examination of the liberal conception of
human nature, begin for the moment with the lillCOntroversial notion that some
beliefs, behaviors, and activities should be left to individual discretion- and that
these deserve state protection from interference. ~o society can claim to be liberal
that does not, as Mill said, draw "a circle around every individual human being which
no government, be it that of one, of a few, or of the many, ought to be permitted to
overstep," or as Friedrich A. Hayek rephrased it, that does not carve out through
publicly declared rules at least some "domain of the individuals (or organized
8
groups) with which others arc not allowed to interfere."~
It follows that in this domain people must be free to act regardless of the consequences both to themselves and others- for example, you do not lose your vote if
you cast it for the irresponsible candidate. Otherwise the state will necessarily be
concerned to constrain every action to accomplish some consequence of which it
approves (or to deter some consequence of which it disapproves), in other words,
an end or good. In classical liberal theory, this private domain can be established
only by what have come to be called "negative rules." The state declares what we may
not do, leaving us free to do whatever is not proscribed. 'This characteristic has been
much noted. Thus, H. L. A. Hart: "The common requirement of law and morality
consists for the most part not of active services to be rendered but of forbearances,
which arc usually formulated in negative form as prohibitions." Lon L. Fuller: "In
what may be called the basic morality of social life, duties that run towards other
persons generally ... normally require only forbearances, or as we say, are negative
in nature." Hayek: "[P]ractically all rules of just conduct are negative in the sense
that they normally impose no positive duties on any one, unless he has incurred
such duties by his own actions." The liberal state says: "Thou shalt not do thus and
so:' It does not say: "Thou must act so as to accomp lish thisan d that". 39
Accept that the state's authority should be limited to declaring negative duties
duties to refrain. Still, restricting the state in that way will not necessarily ensure
usable liberty for the individual to pursue an ultimate good. The state could apply a
negative rule "do not do X, or Y, or Z"-to so many types of conduct that the
space in which to roam would shrivel. A rule of forbearance, therefore, must be
self-limiting in some way.
Since the seventeenth century, only one criterion has gained the assent ofliberals
as a self limiting component of forbearance, and that is the criterion of harm. All
agree that one ought to avoid harming another, and that the state may intercede
to prevent one person from causing another harm or to redress a harm that has
occurred not surprisingly, since a state that frees individuals from the torpor of

~raditionalism must then cabin the restless energy of the individual "sovereigns" that
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1t releases. John Locke put it that the law of nature teaches "that being all equal and
independent, no one ought to harm another in his Life, Health, Liberty, or Possessions." Nearly a century later, Adam Smith opined in A Theory ofMoral Sentiments:
Mere justice is, upon most occasions, but a negative virtue, and only
hinders us from hurting our neighbour. The man who barely abstains
from violating either the person, or the estate, or the reputation of his
neighbours, has surely very little positive merit. He fulfils, however, all
the rules of what is peculiarly called justice, and does every thing which
his equals can with propriety force him to do, or which they can punish
him for not doing. We may often fulfil all the rules of justice by sitting
still and doing nothing.~ 0
Limiting freedom to prevent people from causing harm is, ofcourse, not exclusive
to liberalism. Any political theory worthy of the name must at a minimum incorpo~ate some version of a harm principle. What makes the harm principle of peculiar
~terest here is that liberalism, or at least classical liberalism, proposes that prevent~g or redressing harm to others is the sole basis on which the state may act. In his
Fust Inaugural, Thomas Jefferson perfectly stated this proposition:
With all these blessings (of geography, religion, character, energy], what
more is necessary to make us a happy and prosperous people? Still one
thing more, fellow citizens-a wise and frugal Government, which shall
restrain men from injuring one another, shall leave them otherwise free
to regulate their own pursuits of industry and improvement, and shall
not take from the mouth oflabor the bread it has earned. This is the sum
of good government."''
The classic formulation of the harm principle is that of John Stuart Mill, who in

~8~9 ~ On Liberty asserted "one very simple principle," which, despite its farnil

tartty, IS always worth rereading and which, as a biographer has said, "is so forcibly
and memorably argued that it has passed into the public philosophy of all the great
Western democracies."42
That principle is, that the sole end for which mankind are warranted,
individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of
any of their number is self protection. That the only purpose for which
power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good,
either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully
be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so,

12
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because it will make him happier, because, in the opinions of others, to
do so would be wise, or even right. These are good reasons for remonstrating with him, or reasoning with him, or persuading him, or entreating him, but not for compelling him or visiting him with any evil in case
he do otherwise. To justify that, the conduct from which it is desired to
deter him must be calculated to produce evil to some one else. The only
part of the conduct of anyone, for which he is amenable to society, is that
which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his
independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and
43
mind, the individual is sovereign.

can specify under what conditions lhe state may limit any or all of the types of
liberties is an important part of the .ssue at hand.

Mill's harm principle certainly seems to embody a negative rather than a positive
claim of political power: The state may interfere with us to prevent us from harming
others, even perhaps a tiny harm, but not to force us to do good, even perhaps a
great one. The harm principle is rooted in a suspicion ofstate power and justified by
our uncertainty about the good. The smaller the state's power to command, the freer
we will be, certainly freer of the state, to seek our own ends. This is a common
strategy, not reserved to philosophical inquiry. The approach of many social scientists, Charles E. Lindblom has written, is to identify "ills to escape rather than ideals
4
to approach.... Unable to describe an ideal tomato, they identify the inedible.""
With the meaning and extent of the harm principle I am concerned in all that
follows. For now, observe that Mill's harm principle has five distinct components
and that Mill quite incorrectly called it "one very simple principle'': ( l) harm (2) to
others (3) caused by a wrongdoer (4) permits the state to interfere with (5) the
wrongdoer's liberty of actiotr. The most visible component is that dealing with
"others." 1he state may interfere with our liberty only to prevent us from harming
others; the harm principle rules out, as Mill argues, paternalistic rules. The other
components have often been obscured. The first is that the state may use its coercive
power only when what one person does to another is actually hamiful. An action
that merely affects someone is not, simply by virtue of the effect, a harm that the
. .. euects.
a:
1he
state may prevent or redress; 45 th.ts component ru1es out morali sbc
third, and much more ambiguous, component is that the state may deal only with
harm actually caused by another human being. Mere suffering, misfortune, or bad
luck, therefore, are not ipso facto the types of injuries that permit the state to intervene. Fourth, an important question is the manner by which the state may interfere
with liberty. What methods, sanctions, and remedies may the state use or impose to
deter or redress the harm? Detecting conduct that might (or did) lead to harm, may
the state threaten with criminal sanctions or civil fines, issue civil injunctions, award
private damages, or otherwise "regulate"? Finally, what is the "liberty of action" with
which the state may interfere? Is the state restricted to imposing physical restraints
against the person (incarceration), or may it interfere with other sorts of liberties
(the liberty to contract, the liberty to possess property)? Whether the harm principle
It
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By its terms, the harm principle seems to prescribe a narrow function for government, nothing more. So restricted, it might provide the basis for some of the institutions and practices we associate with liberalism, but not likely all or even most of
them. Where, for example, is separation of powers to be found within its contours,
or frequent elections, or a universal franchise? As it will turn out, the harm principle
cannot serve only to justify and limit the exercise of power. It must also serve to
establish and maintain a government that will both adhere to the harm principle
and faithfully carry it out.
To be useful as a principle ofgovemment, then, the harm principle is complex in
yet another way. A government, even one that draws its energy from the harm principle, is not just a programmed machine, calibrating its power with a dial that moves
from "off" to "full." We cannot simply instruct whoever is in power to sweep away
harmful activity and avoid all else. No such machine does or can exist. Government,
in any event, is not a machine at all, but a collection ofpeople with their own interests
and motives. To expect a harm principle to live up to its name, it must be capacious
enough to confront government along a number of dimensions.
First, we must be concerned with the objects of government power. The harm
principle must, as Mill observed, exert itself against harm to others. So it is necessary
to consider the nature of harm, what it means to harm. Chapters 2 and 3 examine
these issues, concluding that while the intent of the harm principle is to narrow the
focus of government power, what remains open to it is, while constrained, nevertheless quite sizable. One particularly significant human activity, the economic market,
as chapter 4 shows, is subject to policing under the principles developed.
Second, beyond the objects or activities subject to the government's power, the
harm principle must specify to some degree the extent of the power to be exercised.
~en may the government intrude? Must the harm be already manifest? What may
lt tackle? Is it limited to holding up a stop sign or may it affirmatively undertake
:anous "projects" that might be seen as attempting some good rather than preventmg some evil? Chapters 3, 4, and 5 examine these questions, concluding that the
government may broadly tailor its efforts to deal with the whole range of actions
t~at under the principle may be characterized as harmful. That to carry out its rnisSton the government may even direct that people carry out affirmative duties, rather
than merely refrain from harmful conduct, is the subject of chapter 6.
'lhird, to be useful as a practical matter, the harm principle must instruct us on
the means and methods that the government may use to enforce the principle's precepts. Prescribing the death penalty for most offenses under the penal code, as
n~arly was the case in eighteenth-century Great Britain, leads to disrespect, rusobedtence, and a disinclination to follow the ordinances, even if in some way within the
outer limits of the governing principle.46 1he modes of intervention, and the limits
on the forms and reach of those modes, are the subject of chapter 7.
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Fourth, we need some assurance that the harm principle can actually be carried
out, without being co-opted or corrupted by the government it means to legitimate.
The harm principle, in other words, is not a collection of legal ordinances or even a
method of deducing rules that can be enacted into legal restrictions on our conduct.
To the contrary, the harm principle is just that -a principle-and it requires explication. The question of who should interpret it and give it concrete form in particular
instances is particularly urgent. And not merely who, but subject to what sorts of constraints. So the harm principle must necessarily have much to say about who constitutes the government, bow its parts are to be arranged, and the sorts oflimitations that
can be imposed, not merely theoretically but by virtue of institutional practices, such
as separation ofpowers, frequent elections, and decisions constrained by evidence. In
particular, the harm principle implies the right of every person to participate in the
political life and have a say in formulating its varied applications to the harms that
abound. These issues are considered in chapter 8.
Fifth, the harm prmciple may seem to embrace all of life. But it does not, as it
explicitly proclaims. It is the burden of chapters 9 and 10 to explore the reasons for
barring the application of harms that a person may bring upon himself or that arguably befall the culture and the norms of the community.
Sixth, all the considerations just noted imply certain other principles that are not
so much adjunct theories about government power and limitations as they are consequences of the harm principle itself. Significant among them are: ( 1) the principle
ofequality, which states that in ways to be determined the state must treat each person as it treats all others; (2) the principle of neutrality, which asserts that the state
may not impose on people its own notions of their good, if harm is not at stake; (3)
the principle of consent, which states that the public has a stake in the functions and
outputs of government and each person must therefore be permitted to register
consent or disapproval of the government's policies to the extent feasible; and ( 4)
the principle of dialogue, which states that the people must be free to thmk, believe,
associate, and talk to one another and the government, charged as it is to deal with
the harms that impede their life's fulfillment.
Saddling a principle with all these tasks may seem a tall order. Perhaps alternative
principles can more easily explain the liberal commitments than the complex of
considerations that constitute the harm principle.

been the subject of an extensive literature offered as the basis for understanding a
liberal political order. Even if this book were devoted to their themes, rather than
to another, I could not begin to do them JUStice, much less make sense of any of
them in a short passage. So although I offer a somewhat more extended critique in
the Appendix, here I can only fleetingly assert the essence of each and mention
some difficulties.
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Liberal Alternatives to the Harm Principle
Beginning in the early 1970s, political theorists raised liberalism into the realm of
high theory. As theories these ideas became imaginative (and, one is quickly
drawn to observe, imaginary), intricate, sometimes dazzling, but brought to the
ground of policy and politics, faint and largely unheeded. Four major strands
emerged, all with old roots but none that bad ever been developed in such rich and
comprehensive ways. Each-consent, dialogue, equality, and neutrality-has
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Consent-based liberalism rests the exercise of political power on the consent of
the governed, in the familiar phrase. Social contract theory sees no need to justify
consent, since as a practical matter when people freely agree they are unlikely to complain or seek an alternative. Assuming that consent extends to the form and methods
of government and its objects and limits, a full-blown theory of government can be
spun out. But its defect is immediately apparent: Legitimacy depends on actual consent, and we can be confident that in no state could everyone have consented to the
shape and reach of government, which in most lands was in place before anyone
thought to question its legitimacy. Social contract theorists are drawn to just-so
stories or fanciful constructions of how consent might rationally be achieved. John
Rawls, for example, put imaginary people around a table, shorn of most of the characteristics that make us what we are, and inferred how these wraiths and changelings
might reason their way to principles of justice. It turns out that to achieve even this
consensus, the theorist must specify other principles- for example, the rules that
will structure the dialogue in which the conversants will engage. But ifwhat justifies
the rules is consent1 then the participants arc in a vicious circle1 for before they can
consent they must proceed under rules that can be justified only by prior consent.
So the consent is not primary and collapses mto other requirements and principles.
In any event, whether or not other principles are prior to the practice of consent,
hypothetical consent is not consent and cannot reasonably serve as the justification
for the exercise of power.
Dialogue as the theoretical basis of political order suffers from a similar difficulty.
At its broadest, the theory is that legitimate rules of state will emerge when people
sit down to talk things through. They will, say the proponents of dialogue, convince
each other of what rules to adopt for the government to which they will be subject.
~bile no one can doubt the usefulness of actual conversation among real people, it
IS not likely to be effective unless the people proceed under rules that will guide the
discussion. But that is the point of the conversation: to hammer out the rules that
will guide political debate. So the conversation to construct rules cannot proceed
unless such rules are in place to begin with. Again, the theory seems to collapse into
a circularity (or into more than one, since one of the questions to be resolved is
whether all are to be treated equally in the grand founding dialogue; if so, then
perhaps it is equality that is the founding principle). Moreover, there is no theoretical reason to believe that an unconstrained conversation among the people (if that
Were possible) would have any obvious stopping point (beyond the fatigue of the
moment), nor is there any reason to feel confident that the conversation would
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conclude with normatively valid rules. Unlimited conversation could lead to any
outcome: Hobbes's leviathan as well as a worker's council.
The claim of egalitarians is that liberal political theories must begin with equality
because we lack a sound basis to assume the entitlement of particular people to
priority in governing or in political outcomes. Start, then, with the premise that
liberal commitments are justified to the extent that they bind the state to give each
person equal respect. But it is unclear whether an equality rule is based, instead, on
an antecedent rule of neutrality: The state must pay equal respect to persons because
there is no a priori account of which person's end or good is best. (Otherwise, an
equality criterion might be paternalistic, allowing the state, in paying equal respect,
to deny a given person the ability to live his own life on the ground that his poor
choice overlooks his "true" interests.) Moreover, the abstract notion of equality is
insufficient by itself to determine what is to be equalized. Perhaps it is liberty, perhaps resources-but a preliminary equality criterion may be compatible with a
narrow set of liberties or a meager redistribution for all. Equal respect might require
no more than paying careful and sincere attention to each person in determining
whether the state should extend the freedom to act or redistribute the social product; it need not compel the state to do so.
A fourth strand, neutralit}'J holds that liberal institutions and practices are consequences of abstaining from politically pursuing the good. I have already noted the
liberal's propensity for just such a rule: the great difficulty, if not irnpossibilit}'J of
ascertaining the proper end amid a welter of conflicting claims. But premising the
liberal state on such a foundation, the critic charges, involves a contradiction in
terms: Declaring neutrality the state's prime directive IS itself the choice of a good.
It enshrines a rule of choice, against the preferences of many people not to live in a
society in which choice is available. Moreover, the state is open to the same critique
whenever it determines on any course of action, since that very choice is to pursue
some good, a pursuit that neutrality as the core principle would presumably require
it to relinquish.
That these various foundational principles are subject to the reproach that they
are circular or self-contradictory, or that they may collapse into each other's
domains, does not mean that they play no part in liberal institutions and practices.
Each is a significant constituent of the liberal order, not because xt starts with them
but because, as already noted, they are entailed by the harm principle itself.

interference:"' But the critiques often stop just there, denying the principle's utility
without further examining whether it has bite or reach or can effectively draw the
lines that describe a liberal order. It is the burden of much of this book to undertake
just that examination.
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The Modesty of the Harm Principle
Mill's version of the harm principle is now 150 years old. Widely acknowledged, it
has also been widely dismissed, usually because, its critics assert, the concept of
47
harm is too vague to give the principle any traction. As one political theorist summarizes the objection: "Since any activity may be deemed harmful, the principle
has no cutting edge to be employed in the distinction oflegitimate and illegitimate
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Still, it may be worthwhile to consider in briefest compass the sort of work a prin·
ciple is supposed to do-and the modesty of the harm principle in comparison. You
might rashly demand that a principle definitively resolve all relevant questions that
may be fairly put to it, just as a mathematical formula tells us without fail how to
convert a temperature reading from Fahrenheit to Celsius. Some legal rules permit
definitive judgments-if the person sitting on the barstool is provably twenty-one,
he may legally buy a beer; otherwise, not. But these are not the sorts of problems
that fundamental principles are asked to resolve. What we expect to gain from them
is not how to decide whether someone is complying with a legal rule but whether
there ought to be a law in the first place. The primary question for the legislature is
not how to prove a teenager has been tippling but whether the state should prohibit
a class of people from drinking at all. A political regime that rests on an external
code, like the Bible, will have a relatively easy time of it. If it is a sin to commit adultery than it is simple to see that the legislature may crirninalize the prerogative of
kings. That is not our situation. The question that has confronted political thinkers
for more than three centuries is how to determine the legitimate scope of political
power. A principle that could definitively map the state's reach would be as valuable
as it is unprecedented, and unlikely.
Some have supposed that a "genuine" political theory must provide "a set of principles that, by themselves, determine what should be done without the need for
further ad hoc moral judgment, given any specification of the factual circumstances
in which the principles are to be applied."49 Mill supposed that utilitarianism, which
he championed, was such a theory because its fundamental theorem provides a
determinate outcome when the facts are known: Individual actions and public policies are morally correct if they maximize total satisfaction or utility across society.
If society's total happiness would be increased by assassinating mighty Casey at the
Bat after he struck out, thus slaking Mudville's frenzied mob's thirst for revenge, it is
right to do so, even though Mrs. Casey might feel sad for a time. 50 There are, of
course, two reasons to suspect such a theory of failing its mission. The first is the
well-known major theoretical weakness of utilitarianism, that a social maximum
need not respect persons, so that a utilitarian regime can sacrifice some people for
1
the greater satisfaction of others.5 Just this defect fueled Rawls's assault on utilitarianism: "Each person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the
welfare of society as a whole cannot override:'52 The second weakness is that even
accepting the standard, in almost all cases we will find it impossible to apply: How
do we know the utility functions at issue and how can we tell, even if the net satisfaction of society is immediately maximized, that tl1e killing will not so frighten
other players that the game of baseball will collapse, thereafter decreasing the net
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social satisfaction? The abstract standard "maximize" contains no workable calculus
of decision.
Other theories that purport to derive a determinate rule suffer from similar
defects. Thus, to decide under what circwnstances the state may interfere with the
market distribution of goods, Rawls proposed his "difference principle," which follows a "maximin" rule: Inequalities are to be arranged to maximize the primary
goods that go to the worst-off; or, to put it differently, to choose that alternative that
is the least worst. But this rule is also far from determinate. For one thing, Rawls
cannot specify which persons are the "least advantaged," and so he "plead[s] practical considerations ... because [s]ooner or later the capacity of philosophical or
other argwnents to make finer discriminations is bound to run out:' The practical
consideration leads him to choose an arbitrary and blunderbuss standard that
counts as least advantaged "all persons with less than half of the median income and
wealth."53 (Not for Rawls the Shakespearean exaltation in Sonnet 29: "For thy sweet
love rememb'red such wealth brings I That then I scorn to change my state with
kings:') 1he maximin rule is also unconcerned with the number who are benefited
(it could favor small nwnbers of the worst-off to the detriment of large nwnbers of
others only slightly better off), and it fails to account for the gains won and lost.
"Maximin would prefer the outcome in which a single worst-offperson gains a penny's
worth of benefit at the cost of the loss of thousands of dollars for each of thousands of
the better-off."54 So the claim that aggregation (maximizing) and priority (ordering)
rules are necessary to make theories "genuine" seems suspect. Such calculation rules
rarely (most likely, never) provide definitive resolutions to particular issues in the real
world because we cannot specify precisely enough the factual circwnstances that
count. The calculations may be too difficult or the things being counted may be too
indistinct.
The harm principle is more modest. It is not an aggregating or prioritizing principle.
It does not require the state to maximize liberty by minimizing harm or maximizing
the state's response to it. Since most interests are incommensurate, and since few interests can be quantified, maximizing policies, even if they could be made into workable
formulas, would yield specious results. ~s The harm principle answers the question
whether the state may legitimately act, without specifying a necessarily determinate
outcome in each case. It holds that dealing with harm (reducing, preventing, and
redressing harm) is a justifiable aim of government. The state may deal with harm in
all its guises in appropriate ways. But the consequence of a theory that does not
maximize is that the state is not compelled to act in a certain way, or even act at all;
prudential concerns of all sorts may counsel caution and forbearance in the face of
harms, both high and low. (Nothing in the harm principle decrees a particular jail
term for robbery, or even a jail term at all-music downloading, anybody?) The
harm principle, then, states a necessary but not necessarily sufficient condition for
government to act. If harm is in the air, government may sniff it out, but it need,
indeed, ought not, try to diffuse it all.ln real societies with limited resources, people
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face a multitude of misuse and mischief, a kaleidoscope of harm and peril; to
demand that the government go this way and that to root it all out is to risk dissipating its strength and making all worse.
That is nota defect in the theory; it is a condition of our world. We face irreducible
uncertainty both in the background of events and in our ability to predict accurately
what will occur or to determine from measurements and models how to explain
a phenomenon. No one can say with ultimate confidence how we should allocate
resources to minimize harm. Will there be an earthquake? Very well, spend money
to retrofit buildings; or move everyone elsewhere. But in retrofitting buildings,
people will die in construction accidents. Very well, allocate resources to building
engineers to design safer ways to build. But that will take time and in the meantime
an earthquake may strike. And money spent on earthquake prevention is money
diverted from health care, traffic safety, and myriad other activities that cause or
pose a risk of harm. Does a particular prescription drug have an unsafe side effect?
Very well, pull it from the market. But if we do so, many who might have benefited
from it will now suffer, perhaps even die. Are illicit drugs harmful? Very well,
enforce the laws against them. But drug enforcement is very costly and puts many
users in jail who have not harmed and would not harm anyone. The risk of false
positives and false negatives attends every potential decision. No algorithm exists,
and none can be devised, to avoid them, despite the vague claims of utilitarians and
others that their principles can be applied with perfect fidelity and justice to the
world at large. 56

The Self: Autonomous Solitary or Communal Solidary?
Like all political theories, liberalism begins with a conception of human nature. It
presupposes a "self," a personality that has moral agency and at least some capacity
for autonomous choice. Each person is an individual, with an inner being distinct
from all other people, who need not identify herself solely as a fixed member of the
community into which she was born. Each person, moreover, behaves in ways about
which other people may make moral judgments. Without such a notion ofhwnan
nature, liberalism, and the harm principle that underwrites it, would make no sense.
Why provide a private space around every hwnan being unless each person has a
capacity and reason to live and act in it?
This conception of the self, as unexceptionable as it by now may seem, has faced
severe, but usually misleading, criticism. In recent years, liberals have been accused
of relying on a mythical, impossible being: the "unencumbered self," a self that is
"prior to its ends" and that from its own resources somehow cobbles up a destiny to
seek. The reality, the critics assert, is quite to the contrary: a "situated self," a self
constituted by its endsj that is, a person whose selfhood derives beliefs, desires, and
ultimate ends from the social norms of the community in which he was born and
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raised. 57 The unencumbered self is associated with the anthropologically naive
theory of a social contract.58 However, that the social contract argument, first associated with Thomas Hobbes, is erroneous scarcely undercuts the liberal argument.
Hobbes wrote at the dawn of the scientific revolution. The new scientific method
rejected the Aristotelian notion of final cause, an approach to the natural world that
had endured for nearly two millennia. Scientists after Galileo no longer expected to
understand a phenomenon by deducing its causes from a purpose that itself could
only be derived from metaphysical speculation. Instead, scientists resolved the
whole of any phenomenon into its elements and then looked for laws that governed
them. An early statement of scientific reductionism was made by Francis Bacon,
who in his 1620 work The New Organon declared that "in nature nothing really exists
besides individual bodies, performing pure individual acts according to a fixed
law:.w In physics, this new approach led to Newton's triumph. In social science, this
same approach seemed likewise to require repudiating Aristotelianism, specifically
60
the view that human community was prior to any individual.
Applying these principles to the social realm, Hobbes, a friend and admirer of
Galileo, asserted that "nothing in the world [is] Universal! but Names; for the things
named, are every one of them Individual and Singular:.6t Hobbes took the general
political phenomenon he wished to explain-political community -and dissolved
it into what he conceived to be its elements, disconnected individuals, possessing
natural rights, living in an isolated original condition he called the "state of nature."
62
The whole he then reassembled according to the logic by which these atomistic
individuals behaved. Hobbes made two assumptions about natural humans not
bound by political restraints: that each would seek power over others and that all are
fundamentally equal in body and mind (differences from person to person, he held,
were contained within narrow limits). From these assumptions Hobbes easily
deduced that the state of nature was a state ofwar, a condition so fearful and uncertain
that for the sake of industry, culture, navigation, building, technology, arts, letters,
and security, solitary individuals had long ago mutually agreed in a "social contract"
to yield their individual rights to a sovereign. Individuals, then, are the enduring
63
reality; the state is their instrument, artificially created to serve their interests.
So ran the argument, quite contrary to preliberal beliefs, and it ran pretty far,
straight to the nineteenth-century conclusion that each person ought to be virtually
free and independent of the state. Since individuals come first, their rights must
come first; the artificial construction of "society" cannot have rights superior to
those who constitute it. As the British essayist William Hazlitt put it in 1828:
Society consists ofa given number ofindividuals; and the aggregate right
of government is only the consequence of these inherent rights, balancing and neutralising one another. How those who deny natural rights
get at any sort of right, divine or human, I am at a loss to discover; for
whatever exists in combination, exists beforehand in an elementary

The Liberal Premise

21

state. The world is composed of atoms, and a machine cannot be made
without materials. 64
Hazlitt's error is obvious: One might as well say that since spleens exist in combination with kidneys in each person, both spleens and kidneys must have existed
beforehand by themselves.65
Nevertheless, the apparent scientific premise of this idea of the self has retained a
powerful hold on our thinking to this day. Even its detractors seem unable, at times,
to avoid it. For example, Stephen Spender, the British poet and critic, denouncing
the modem emphasis on the fulfillment of private interests, once argued:
Throughout history the comparative failure of every human generation
has been that of the inability of those living to think of life as a single
consciousness of which each separate contemporary person is a minute
extension, and not a whole world unto himself or herself. No one is to be
blamed for this failure which is indeed the result of the condition of isolation into which each of us is born.66
Despite its lineage, this doctrine of the biological and historical primacy of the
individual is hopelessly at odds with what we have come to learn about human
development and history. That birth itself is an expulsion "into isolation" may be a
physical fact, but it is not a sociological, psychologtcal, genetic, or neurological
fact, and it is, after all, only a moment, before and after which each person is neces .
sarily connected to others. Spender has confounded a single moment of separation
at birth with the socialization of childhood. Studies of psychological and social
developmenr show that the adult personality is not self-created: Individuals do
not and ca.n not precede the community of men and women into which they arc
68
born. It blinks reality to maintain that people shape themselves, that their very
desires, preferences, beliefs, enthusiasms, hopes, and fears are rationally chosen,
rather than implanted, grown, shaped, and nurtured by parents and family, playmates, neighbors, and even strangers in the community, by the actions they take
and the stories they tell-or that this process stops when the child becomes an
adult. Family socialization, Michael Walzer has quipped, "is just agitprop with
69
love." Socialization, though it can take innumerable forms1 is universal. Decades
before evolutionary psychologists caught up, Lewis Mumford wrote that "man
might even be defined as a creature never found in a 'state of nature; for as soon as
he becomes recognizable as man he is already in a state of culture:''0
Considerable evidence suggests that through most of our existence humans
have thought of themselves first as players on the community's stage, not as writers
of their own lines. Throughout the medieval era, Jacob Burckhardt wrote, "man
was conscious of himself only as a member of a race, people, party, family or
corporation-only through some general category.'.n Man, it was assumed, had a
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place in a divinely ordered "great chain ofbeing" and as Tocqueville noted, "every
individual necessarily belonged to a group and no one could regard himself as an
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power and may choose to do so. Thus the warning of a returning Soviet teenager in
1989 about the dangers of Russian youth traveling to capitalist countries:

7

isolated unit.'' '
Psychologically and historically, then, there is no unencumbered self, and there
never was. Human beings are not self-made; no ghostly 'T' sits in some control seat
in the mind willing a "me" into existence by assembling a psychological unity from
'
..
4
a stockpile of desires, beliefs, and dispositions.' Humans are forged from others. ·
They must necessarily be situated selves. The situated self is not a solitary self; it is,
rather, a solidary self, constituted by others and responsible to them. In this telling
(discussed in more detail in chapter 10), it is the community, not the individual, that
76
is the carrier of value.
Nevertheless, when used to deny liberal premises, the conclusions drawn from
the modem account of the self suffer from three fallacies. The first is the non sequi7
tur that derives rights from the creation of a selC 1here is no necessary or logical
connection between rights and the origin of the individual. It does not follow that
because my genetic, family, and cultural background determine my dreams and
desires the community may dictate the ends I should seek, or that ifsomehow all on
my own I had wished myself into being the community would be bound to permit
an autonomous me to do whatever I pleased. In short, it no more follows from the
social priority of the community that the individual should have no rights than it
follows from the moral priority of the individual that the community, through the
state, should have no power. The relationship between individual and community is
8
the very problem to be solved.'
The second fallacy is the tacit assumption the antiliberal makes about the nature
of the situated self. That the self is shaped by community says nothing about what
sort of self the community will create. That depends on the community. There is no
single "natural" communal approach to child-rearing and no single communal view
about the appropriate relation between individual and community. Why else bas
there been a philosophical conversation about these issues lasting now more than
two millennia?
A community may fashion selves who view themselves solely as part of a general
category within the social mass, as Burckhardt characterized the psychological assumption of the Middle Ages. But the acculturated selfis not logically and inherently
a clone of the community, slavishly adhering to community norms. A community may
instead create the sort of individual capable ofself-reflection and with the motivation
and will to distance himself from the society whence he sprang. A person need not be
self-made to feel and exercise at least some degree of autonomy. A belief, however
acquired, can be that it is possible to review one's ends and even change them as it
becomes apparent it is proper to do so. "What is central to the liberal view is not that
we can perceive a self prior to its ends, but that we understand our selves to be prior
79
to our ends, in the sense that no end or goal is exempt from possible re-examination."
Such a self need not feel a compulsion to rethink its ends; it is enough that it has the

-

I had the chance to go to the United States on an exchange basis. I used
to be a true patriot of our country and I turned into something really
horrible. I became a human being. I think; I have my own opinions; it's a
nightmare. After what I saw in the USA it's impossible to live here. 80
People change jobs, careers, parties, homes, and spouses (though perhaps fans
never stop rooting for the Chicago Cubs). I may originally understand myself as a
southwestern American Presbyterian Republican male heterosexual with a certain
fetish, but come to understand that I will be better off without one or more of these
"constituted" or "embedded" roles or attributes (or that, like the Tin Woodman, I
can still be me while ridding myself of one part and adding another). We neither do
nor need shed one practice, desire, role, or belief on a whim: We attach value to the
changed positions we adopt.
As a basis for determining proper governing rules, the origin of the self is irrelevant, therefore, since the source of the developmental force does not preordain the
81
type of self it will produce. Animals may be unable to escape the ends assigned to
them by biology, but for humans even anatomy is no longer destiny. A self constituted by its ends need not be cabined by them. Nothing in the empirical evidence
offered by critics suggests that individuals cannot arise above, descend below, or
step sideways from their origins and become something other than what, unfiltered
by thought, they might have become. A situated sel~ in other words, can become at
the very least a partially unencumbered one.

The third fallacy follows from the second. Just as a particular community can
create a partially unencumbered sel~ so too it can creale the conditions for individu:wty generally, as Emile Durkheim argued more than a century ago. 82 A community, even an extremely stratified community that perpetuates social hierarch}'J may
change over time, as invention, growth of knowledge, historical circumstance, and
self-reflection put custom and convention to the test. In the west, the emancipation (or escape) of individuals from conununity began a thousand years ago, and
continues to this day. A personal sense of the self began to emerge as early as the
83
eleventh century. It was implicit in the Christian idea of personal salvation84 and
took explicit form with the Reformation. Economically and politically, serfs and
others from at least the twelfth century could escape their villeinage by residing a
year and a day in a city (as the German proverb put it, Stadtluft machtJrei: city air
85
makes you free). An important part of this history is thus the gradual disappearance of slavery, serfdom, and peonage as justified institutions, and the freeing of
people from group responsibility and collective guilt for conduct by members of
f:arnily, cIan, caste, and tribe.86 Throughout the world selves have become considerably less situated and encumbered than they once were.
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The L1bual Prtmlst

If it is incorrect to asswnc that community is reducible to its individual members, it is no more correct, or at least no more proven, that individuals are reducible
to the community in which they live and participate. Community and individual are
interdependent, and so the real self does not lie at extremes. A truer conception of
hwnanity is the self standing between the solitary and the solidary, neither the person immovably attached to roles within the community to whom some antiliberals
wish to return nor the atomistic individual whom they incorrectly blame liberals for
creating and serving. It is the person Jacob Bronowski has called the "social
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solitary,"87 at home neither outside society nor submerged within it. lh.is is the
person the liberal seeks to protect through a political system that supports liberty to
seek the good life, individually accepted as given or modified and refined as each
individually has chosen.
A separate critique of the liberal conception of the autonomous self, not from the
left but the right, can be dispatched more summarily. Some conservatives contend
that the liberal venture must inevitably capsize on the shoals of individuals' proclivity to do evil. Alan Wolfe summarizes one recent conservative claim, by John
Kekes, that the roots ofliberalism are inherently contradictory:

Pointing to the receptivity of American constitutionalism even to those who
wish to be Nazis, Stephen Macedo comments that they must nevertheless be
"law-abiding Nazis.... They cannot be 'gung-ho' Nazis, in fact they cannot be Nazis
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at aU but only play at it." That is neither an accident nor a contradiction. In the
liberal theory here proposed, when people cause harm, whatever the nature of their
internal selves, the state may act. Containing, moderating, deflecting, redressing,
and eliminating harm is the state's central function. 92
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If we allow individuals to be autonomous, then they may use their unfettered powers to do evil things. Under such conditions, liberals face an
impossible dilemma: if they insist on autonomy, they enhance the
amount of cruelty in the world, but if they demand the diminishment of
cruelty first, they undermine their commitment to autonomy.... Much
of liberal thought, says Kekes, is devoted to unsuccessful attempts to
avoid this dilemma. When liberals argue backward from the fact of evil
to the view that anyone who commits such an act could not have been
"really" autonomous, for no autonomous person would choose an evil
course, they are attaching preconditions to agency which, whether they
admit it or not, reduce the agent's autonomy to establish his own condi89
tions, and in this way compromising themselves philosophically.
Kekes's view misapprehends the claims ofautonomy. Unfettered autonomy ofcourse
can lead evildoers to act cruelly, but a theory based on the harm principle need not
respect claims to unfettered autonomy. The most doctrinaire libertarian agrees that
each person's freedom must be consistent with others' like freedom. Liberalism has
never presupposed absolute liberty or "unfettered powers," even of autonomous
selves. Indeed, Joseph Raz, a liberal "perfectionist;' agrees that "autonomy-based
freedom ... does not extend to the morally bad and repugnant." Raz argues, contrary
to the liberalism I am defending, that there is an ultimate good that the state should
pursue (namely, autonomy for each person). Since autonomy is only valuable if the
autonomous person pursues the good, "providing, preserving or protecting bad
.
. val uable autonomy.''90
options
does not enable one to enJOY
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A Few Words about Reason
~u~h a.bused, rarely defined, "reason" has been attacked as responsible for liberalIsm's miStakes and confusions. Conservative critics berate philosophers for relying
on mtellect to design a new society to correct unsatisfactory conditions in our present one: ''Conservatism's enemy ... is the attempt to remake society on the basis of
formulae, explicit rules that declare the fundamental norms for social life."93 We
should not discount the fear. Entire societies have been brought to ruin by those
who deduced their way to abolishing old traditions wholesale, and it is certainly
true that reason has not bathed a single way of life in universal assent. So it is a useful
ca~tion to be reminded that reason lies yet under the Cartesian spell that we can
thmk our way back to the beginnings of things and then reassemble them to something brighter and more rational. It is not accidental that many liberals, reasoning
their way to a better future, often tell founding stories, imagining social contracts,
constrained conversations, and disembodied selves. It ought to be obvious that
behind those veils sits the solitary thinker who wishes to make sense of things however he can.
That is just the problem, say those who object to the reasoned elaboration of

~olitics. Life is refractory and makes sense, if at all, only long afterward. We should,
mstead, live in our felt communal trad!tions and refrain from adjusting them to a set
of universal principles that are all-embracing only in the mind of a solitary philosopher. Philosophy-the mind's attempt to discern goodness (or evil), rightness (or
Wrongness), and order (or disorder) from within-can ignorantly (one hesitates to
say .thoughtlessly) obstruct and ultimately wreck what works. Philosophy excludes
feelings} longings1 yearnings, and the complexity ofconnections forged in the richness
of the past, aU in a vain attempt to describe or explain events and generate an ordered
system of abstract principles. Philosophy, by this account, is soulless, passionless,
empty. It gives us nothing to cheer for. In short, philosophy is religion without the
football tean1.
. Moreover, the critique continues, reason is merely an option. Those who employ
It as a tool mtolerantly assume it superior to other alternatives. Liberalism in
essence, says Stanley Fish, is a faith in reason, and, so, liberalism is a faith like all the
others. Though liberalism purports to be tolerant of other faiths it is not and cannot
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be, since it necessarily discounts any worldview that does not proceed according to
reason: "[L]iberalism depends on not inquiring into the status of reason, depends,
that is, on the assumption that reason's status is obvious: It is that which enables us
to assess the claims of competing perspectives and beliefs:' Liberalism, says Fish,
can be
tolerant only within the space demarcated by the operations of reason;
any one who steps outside that space will not be tolerated, will not be
regarded as a fully enfranchised participant in the marketplace (of ideas)
over which reason presides. In this liberalism does not differ from fundamentalism .... [T]he principle of a rationality that is above the partisan
fray {and therefore can assure tts "fairness") is not incidental to liberal
thought; it is liberal thought, and if it is "softened" by denying reason its
priority and rendering it just one among many legitimate paths/ liber94

alism would have no content.

Liberalism wrongly claims not to be "the program of any particular group or party:'
But since it is the program of the party of reason, it is no different from any competing vision of the truth, "and therefore in the absence of that difference one can
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only conclude1 and conclude nonparadoxically, that liberalism doesn't exist:' Fish
appears to be offering this sophistry without a wink and with his tongue planted
firmly outside his cheek.
For if there is no reason to give reason priority, there is no reason to give any
competing approach priority either. But Fish is simply wrong, and he knows better.
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Reason is not a faith but an inescapable part of being human. Edmund Burke did
not stamp his foot-he wrote a book. Reason-his reason-told him not to tinker;
he did not go out at night, sword drawn, to dispatch his foes without an explanation.
No competing faith dispenses with reason. Nor is it the exclusive tool of a particular
political perspective: Mass disasters have flowed from "reasoned" policies of both
the left and the right.97 (Even terrorists offer reasons to justify their actions, and
reckon strategically that violence and destruction will cause their opponents to
reconsider and will perhaps cow their compatriots too.) People of all faiths/ who live
every way of life, employ reason continuously and broadly in explaining how their
assumptions should translate into institutions, practices1 and rules. No religious tradition could survive without reason-in an important sense, religion as practiced is
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the record of reasoned interpretation of tradition {and1 for man}'J of revelation).
That people's capacity to reason varies, that fools are unaware of their limitations/
that intelligence often strays from reasoned conclusions, that true believers often
ignore the facts or fail to assess them, that human cognitive skill may not be sufficiently powerful to understand and explain that at which it aims are no arguments
for abandoning reason.99 As if we could. And abandon it for what? Ifwe have learned
that the ''role assigned to reason" in reconstructing society can be "too big," we
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ought not forget that for most of human history it has been too small. 100 The opposite of reason is not some other sort of reason: It is not reasonmg. It is the Terminator.
It is the bullet in Winston Smith's head.101
Those sixteenth- and seventeenth-century thinkers who pondered the disloca~on and destruction of religious wars did not begin as liberals; they began as warners. Their concern about social conditions led them to interrogate the assumptions
that impelled rulers1 armies1 and common folk to fight and live {and die) as they did.
~hat they found was belieflodged in superstition, acceptance rooted in authority,
life governed by tradition. Armies of states, contending for biblical rectitude, went
head to head1 brutal slaughter and misery the inevitable result. On the home front,
o~e class of human being lorded over another, asserting prerogatives, privileges1 and
diktats that astonish us today. In Great Britain, to single out only one culture, the
lord of the manor was entitled to bed any woman within hts domain1 married or
single/ no matter her wishes. Children were yoked to their parents' trades. A jobless
man who strayed from home searching for work was whipped and returned to his
parish. Social class determined manner of dress, which was strictly regulated by law.
You went to church or you were fined, or worse (in Henry VIII's time, the penalty
for denying transubstantiation was to be roasted alive). 102 Though the belief1 authority/ and tradition seemed reasonable to those who professed the need for
things to remain as they were1 those who thought about the misery and indignity
that these customs and laws fostered saw that there were other possibilities. These
other possibilities matured into liberal theories. The theories were enunciated in
books, carried over to the street a~ maxims1 and translated piecemeal and never
wholly into law by civil servants.
But nothing in liberal reason1 skeptical about knowing the ultimate good, has led
to human beings being shackled in the service of some Absolute: A political theory
of limits and impartiality does not produce a Stalin or a Hitler, religious zealots1 or
revolutionary despots. Certitude, not doubt, provokes violence and reaction. It was
the unreason of antiliberals, not the reason of liberals, that almost destroyed the
world in the first half of the twentieth century.103
When a political argument is recorded in an essay or a book1 it cannot1 in the
nature of things, aim at or succeed in capturing more than a partial view. Books are
not social life, though they may intrude on it; books are not public policies, though
they may be partisan; books are not the voices ofothers than their authors. Whether
a book succeeds in prompting the change it advocates depends in large part on
whether the author understands the assumptions of its readers. Those who wrote
the essays that in time we came to see as liberal shared with their readers more than
a gnawing apprehension of power. Those who identify with power-holders and discount abuse are much less likely to suppose that they will ever be abused and are
more likely therefore to accept a theory that the old ways have value and should be
maintained. But the liberal writers came to feel that people had been abused by
power-holders. They sought to uncover the spell that held them in its grip, and m
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the age when science promised the power to change lives for the better, not surprisingly thought that through the same power of reason they could do so too. Whether
they reflected thoughts of the day they distilled in their writings, or prompted the
thoughts, liberal theorists saw over time the partial success of their intellectual
labor, both in implementing policy and translating their reasoning into the commonplace notions of a later day.
What we know now, what tempered by history reason itself has taught us, is that
reason itself is never enough; it cannot work usefully or intelligently without worldly
knowledge. "The life of the law," Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes memorably opined,
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"has not been logic; it has been experience.'' Liberalism as a system rooted in the
harm principle is reason acting upon experience. Government, it began to dawn on
people, is the application of reason to social life; that is, as we say, its rationale. Liberals
do not suppose they can or should try to change the world in the abstract by following
metaphysical precepts dreamed up in the darkness of a closed and isolated cloister.
That lawmaking and policy-setting may misfire and substitute now and then a new
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evil for an existing one, as the great cynic Ambrose Bierce reminds us, is not a
reason to despair. It is a reason to work harder, learn more, reason better.
Rawls, the preeminent political theorist of our age, asks the primary political
question anew: "When may citizens by their vote properly exercise their coe;cive
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political power over one another when fundamental questions are at stake?" His
answers are difficult to assess. The complexity of his thought (and prose), and that
of other liberal political thinkers, is problematic. One critic has complained that justice theory has "become so specialized and so academic and so utterly unreadable
that it has become just another intellectual puzzle, a conceptual Gordian knot await107
ing its academic Alexander.'' Liberalism opens itself for public inspection; it does
not hide behind history's veil and should not hide behind the density of abstruse
theory. "Like his empiricist counterparts in science, the liberal insists that intelligible
justifications in social and political life must be available in principle for everyone,
for society is to be understood by the individual mind, not by the tradition or sense
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of a community.'' In that spirit, seeking to answer the primary question, this book
proceeds.

